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Abstract 
Using data from the UN World Population Prospects, we document global trends in 
lifespan inequality from 1950 until 2015. Our findings indicate that (i) there has been a 
sustained decline in overall lifespan inequality, (ii) adult lifespan variability has also 
declined, but some plateaus and trend reversals have been identified, (iii) lifespan 
inequality among the elderly has increased virtually everywhere, (iv) most of the world 
variability in age-at-death can be attributed within-country variability. Such changes 
have occurred against a backdrop of generalized longevity increases. Our analyses 
suggest that the world seems to be facing a new challenge: the emergence of diverging 
trends in longevity and age-at-death inequality among the elderly around the globe – 
particularly in high-income areas. As larger fractions of the world population survive to 
more advanced ages, it will be necessary that national and international health planners 
recognize the growing heterogeneity that characterizes older populations. 
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1. Introduction 
Living long and healthy lives is among the most highly valued and universal human 
goals, so the unparalleled longevity gains recorded all over the world during the last 
decades is a cause for celebration. While a huge body of scholarship has shed 
considerable light on the ‘efficiency part’ of the process (i.e. the global, regional and 
country trajectories in life expectancy over time are very well documented [1 – 2]), 
much less is known about the ‘equality part’. Since mortality can arguably be 
considered as the ultimate measure of health, lifespan inequalities should be seen as the 
most fundamental manifestations of health disparities. Indeed, the existence of very 
unequal length of life distributions might go beyond purely natural causes and could be 
indicative of an unfair state of affairs in which some population groups might be 
disadvantaged or discriminated against. For this reason, the study of lifespan variability 
has attracted a great deal of attention from demographers and other social scientists, 
particularly during the last decade or so [3 – 15].  
Studies on lifespan disparities usually focus their attention on differences occurring 
either between or within countries. The former approach typically compares the average 
health performance among a cross-section of countries (most often by comparing the 
corresponding life expectancies) and aims at understanding why population health is 
better in some countries than in others [16 – 18]. In contrast, the latter approach 
explores the lifespan differences that might exist among the individuals within a given 
country. Surprisingly, the study of global lifespan inequality (henceforth referred to as 
GLI) – that is: the study of variations in individuals’ lifespan both within and between 
all world countries (henceforth WLI and BLI, respectively) – is largely underdeveloped; 
so far, it has only been analyzed in a couple of studies either using one or two cross-
sections in time ([4], [19]). Despite its importance, our understanding of how the 
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different types of inequalities are articulated into a coherent whole and how their 
relationship evolves as the demographic transition unfolds is still in its infancy – an 
issue we aim to address in this paper. For the first time, we document the joint evolution 
in within country, between country and global lifespan inequality during the period 
spanning from 1950 to 2015, and we investigate in detail the relationship between these 
trends and the advances in longevity that are sweeping the world.  
There are many reasons to be interested in the study of global trends in length of life 
inequality. First, from a practical perspective we now have the possibility to do so. Not 
long ago, the set of life tables needed to conduct comparative analyses across and within 
world countries for long time periods was very difficult to access for researchers. 
Second, from an ethical perspective, if all human beings are entitled to equal rights, 
egalitarian concerns should apply equally at the national and global levels (e.g. should 
we tolerate individual’s lifespan prospects to be determined by their country of birth?). 
Third, the study of global inequalities allows us to see how the world has changed – 
often in fundamental ways – and to study the hotly debated consequences of economic 
globalization or other global phenomena affecting the living conditions of all human 
beings. Last but not least, exploring how age-at-death differentials jointly evolve within 
and between countries can throw considerable light on our understanding of human 
mortality processes and improve the quality of national and international public health 
policies. 
An analysis of global lifespan inequality must necessarily take into consideration the 
unprecedented demographic transformations undergone by the world and its regions 
since the 1950s. On the one hand, the unfolding of the demographic and 
epidemiological transitions during more than six decades have dramatically changed 
world countries’ population structures. While the prevalence of infant mortality was 
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particularly high among most world countries in the mid-20th century, nowadays 
childhood and reproductive-age mortality have shrunk considerably, thus moving age-
at-death distributions to more advanced ages. On the other hand, country-specific life 
expectancies and the corresponding population shares (which in turn are affected by 
differential population growth trajectories) strongly influence global trends in lifespan 
inequality. To gauge the specific effect that such structural changes have had on lifespan 
variability across and within countries we incorporate the following analytical 
strategies. First, we study lifespan variability not only across the entire age range, but 
also across adult and more advanced age ranges. For convenience, the last two ranges 
comprise the ages above 15 and above 65, respectively (similar age thresholds have 
been used in many conceptually related papers [4 – 5], [19]); the substantive findings of 
the paper remain unaffected by the choice of alternative thresholds). As suggested in 
previous studies, there are good reasons to separate childhood, adult and elderly 
mortality [3 – 5], [19]. Second, we resort to well-known and newly developed 
inequality decomposition techniques that allow going beyond purely descriptive results 
and analyze what factors are the most important drivers of lifespan dispersion and its 
evolution over time. Inter alia, we run several counterfactual analyses to identify the 
influence that countries’ relative population size, longevity and within country lifespan 
inequality have had on the dynamics of global lifespan inequality. 
The empirical analysis relies on the latest version of United Nations’ World Population 
Prospects (WPP) for the period from 1950 to 2015. The huge geographic coverage of 
the database (195 countries) allows performing global, regional and country-level 
analyses over time. Based on this data source, this paper aims to (i) document levels and 
trends in longevity and lifespan inequality for overall, adult and elderly mortality in the 
world and its regions; (ii) decompose global lifespan inequality in its within- and 
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between-country components and assess what the corresponding contributions are; and 
(iii) examine the main potential sources of lifespan inequality within and across 
countries. 
1.1 Longevity and lifespan variation 
Classical health transition theories suggest that longevity increases go in tandem with a 
transformation of the mortality distribution characterized by a concentration of deaths 
around the modal age at death, with both the mean and modal age at death increasing 
[20 – 21]. In this line, the so-called ‘mortality compression’ or ‘rectangularization 
hypothesis’ popularized by Fries [22] postulates that as the epidemiological transition 
unfolds, the human survival curves gradually adopts a rectangular shape as life 
expectancy at birth increases and approaches an upper limit of the human lifespan. In 
the limit, the survival curve would become fully rectangular and all deaths would occur 
at the same age. While some studies suggest that the maximum lifespan of humans is 
fixed and is unlikely to increase over time [23], most empirical evidence has shown no 
evidence of an upper bound to life expectancy, which continues to increase unabated 
[2], [24].  
The progressive rectangularization of the survival curve has been observed in several 
high-income countries [25 – 26]. In the majority of cases, increasing longevity is 
associated with low lifespan disparities when one considers the entire range of ages at 
death [6]. Yet, several studies have noted that restricting our attention to selected age 
ranges, the relationship between longevity and lifespan variability weakens, and even 
reverses. For the US, [27] found that while the relationship between life expectancy and 
lifespan inequality across the entire age range was negative, the relationship turned 
positive when the age at death distribution was bottom-truncated at the age of 60. [28 – 
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29] and [5] found similar patterns for other highly industrialized countries. In the same 
context, [3] found stagnating – rather than the expected declining – trends in lifespan 
variability when bottom truncating the lifespan distribution at the age of 10. While the 
selection of specific age ranges in the study of mortality compression has been criticized 
on grounds of arbitrariness ([29], page 187), several authors suggest that studying 
variability measures conditional upon survival to a certain age (i.e. exploring the so-
called ‘conditional’ age-at-death distributions) is a promising avenue of research that 
can reveal unexpected patterns in adult mortality that are otherwise concealed by 
unconditional measures [5], [21]. As longevity increases and larger fractions of the 
population survive to more advanced ages, it becomes important to go beyond the 
analysis of mortality across the entire age range and focus our attention on some of its 
subsets. Rather than sticking to a particular age range, in this paper we document global 
trends in overall, adult and elderly lifespan variability.  
Current evidence on global length of life inequality and its between- and within-country 
subcomponents is still incomplete. In general, unconditional length of life inequality 
within countries has tended to decrease as longevity increases [4], [6]. Yet, [5] report 
increases in lifespan variability among the elderly within a group of high-income 
countries. As regards between-country variation, some cross-national studies report 
worldwide convergence in life expectancy levels between the 1950s and the late 1980s 
[18], [30]. Unfortunately, the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa and the collapse of 
Communism contributed to reverse this favorable trend. Lastly, the evidence on global 
trends in lifespan inequality is particularly scarce. Using life tables from 180 countries, 
[19] shows that the world inequality in length of life diminished between 1970 and 
2000. In line with the previous two studies, his findings suggest that between-country 
inequality increased between the two points of time – a matter of concern for public 
Pre-print. Forthcoming: PLoS ONE 
7 
 
health planners. One of the main aims of this paper is to expand the scope of the 
previous studies by giving a detailed account of the global trends in lifespan inequality 
for the world and its regions during the last 65 years. In our analysis, we will explore 
both unconditional and conditional age-at-death distributions.  
2. Data  
The main data source employed in this paper is the UN World Population Prospects’ 
(WPP) abridged life tables, recording the number of deaths for age groups in 5-year 
intervals (with separate data for infants (age group 0-1) as well as an open-ended 100+ 
interval) for the 1950-2015 time span, again over 5-year periods. We aggregate our 
estimates for both sexes, but data is also available separately for females and males (see 
the discussion section). The life tables information is complemented with countries’ 
population size (also available from UN’s WPP), which is needed to calculate the 
between-country component of global lifespan inequality.  
In our analysis we use life tables from 195 countries over 13 5-year time periods (from 
1950-55 until 2010-15), yielding a total of 2535 country-period observations. To 
facilitate the presentation of our results, we aggregate the data at different levels 
employing the standard United Nations’ regional classification of countries (in the 
Supplementary Material section we show the countries included in each of these 
regions). Due to the marked impact of the HIV-Aids epidemic on length-of-life 
distributions, we create a separate category for Sub-Saharan African countries which 
have had a HIV prevalence of more than 3%.  
While there is excellent data on mortality by age group for high-income countries, data 
are generally more sparse and less reliable for developing countries. Nevertheless, the 
UN population division has assembled a broad data set of country life tables and 
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provides a detailed account of the data sources used in the construction of each 
countries’ set of mortality estimates (see https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataSources/). 
Although the use of model life tables is unavoidable for constructing complete data 
series for all developing countries, all missing country-year combinations are estimated 
via indirect methods based on real data. Therefore, while the accuracy of individual 
inequality estimates might not be perfect for every country in every year, we have 
strong reasons to believe that the broad picture that emerges from them is a faithful 
portrait of reality. As indicated along this paper, our empirical findings square well with 
those from other renowned studies, and the estimates we obtain from the UN WPP are 
highly correlated with the estimates derived from other reputable data sources, like the 
Human Mortality Database (HMD). 
3. Methods 
3.1 Measuring lifespan inequality 
Currently, there is an unsettled debate on whether lifespan inequality should be 
measured using absolute or relative measures (sometimes also referred to as ‘additive’ 
and ‘proportional’ measures, respectively). While there is a long tradition in using 
relative inequality measures (partly driven by their massive use among economists 
because of their ability to compare income distributions expressed in different 
currencies), there is no theoretical reason why one should disregard the use of absolute 
ones when exploring differences in length of life. The choice between absolute and 
relative measures can be problematic when assessing trends because the corresponding 
results do not necessarily coincide – an issue that is partly attributable to the explicit 
dependence of relative measures to the values of the mean, which tend to change over 
time. Very often, relative measures might show declines because the mean has 
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increased, while absolute measures might remain unaffected – a technical point that 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. Since the choice 
between both kinds of measures is purely normative [31] and no clear consensus seems 
to be in place, in this paper we use both absolute and relative inequality measures.  
In the last few years, several measures have been proposed to measure lifespan 
variability (see [32] for an excellent review of the most widely used measures). We 
have selected specific inequality indices based on their popularity and their 
decomposability properties, which, as we show below, are very useful for the purposes 
of this paper. The first measure we consider is the Theil index, which is a relative 
measure defined as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 = 1𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 �𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎� 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎�𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1] 
where 𝑎𝑎 and 𝜔𝜔 are the youngest and oldest age intervals taken from the life table, 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 is 
the radix of the population, 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 is the average age at death of the population, and 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 and 
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 are the life table number of deaths and the average age at death in the age interval 𝑥𝑥 
to 𝑥𝑥 + 5, respectively. When 𝑎𝑎 = 0 we are including the entire lifespan distribution and 
when 𝑎𝑎 = 15 we disregard mortality under 15 and focus on adult mortality only. Since 
both approaches have been used in the literature (see [4], [19]), we calculate inequality 
statistics both for the unconditional and conditional distributions. In addition, we also 
investigate lifespan inequality trends when 𝑎𝑎 = 65, that is: length of life inequality 
among the population beyond the standard retirement age – an analysis that, so far, has 
only been conducted in a reduced group of high-income countries (see [5]).  
Another of the inequality indices we will consider in the paper is the variance. Using the 
same notation as before it is defined as: 
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𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 = 1𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 �𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥(𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎)2𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2] 
Unlike the Theil index, the variance is an absolute inequality measure. Again, we will 
report the values of this inequality measure for 𝑎𝑎 = 0,𝑎𝑎 = 15 and 𝑎𝑎 = 65. As a 
robustness check, in a Supplementary Material section we complement our analysis 
showing the results arising from other well-known inequality measures, like the Gini 
index or the coefficient of variation. 
3.2. Inequality decompositions 
The reason why we have chosen the inequality indices shown in equations [EQ1], 
[EQ2] is that they are amenable to interesting decompositions that can throw some light 
on the factors behind lifespan variability dynamics. The Theil index and the variance are 
known for their additive decomposability property. This means that global lifespan 
inequality (i.e. variations in age at death around the whole world) can be broken down 
in two clearly interpretable components: the inequality observed within countries and 
the one capturing the differences in average attainment between countries. More 
formally, additively decomposable inequality measures can be written as     
𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 + 𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3] 
In the last equation,  𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 represents the inequality that would be observed in a 
hypothetical distribution (sometimes referred to as ‘smoothed distribution’) where the 
age at death of each individual corresponds to the average age at death in the 
corresponding country (i.e. eliminating within-country variations). The second term is a 
weighted average of lifespan inequality within countries. The decomposition formula 
[EQ3] can be applied irrespective of the choice of the age range (i.e. both for 
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conditional and unconditional lifespan distributions – see the Supplementary Material 
section for a full development of this equation). 
3.3. Lifespan variation counterfactuals 
As shown in the Supplementary Material section, global lifespan inequality is a function 
of three factors: (i) population shares (𝑠𝑠), (ii) longevity (𝜇𝜇), and (iii) lifespan 
variability (𝐼𝐼) in the different world countries. To simplify notation and explicitly 
indicate the dependency of lifespan inequality on these three factors, we will 
schematically rewrite equation [EQ3] as 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔𝑡𝑡}, {𝝁𝝁𝑡𝑡}, {𝑰𝑰𝑡𝑡})          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸4] 
where the bold letters indicate the country-wise vectors of population shares, longevity 
and within-country inequality, respectively, the subscript ‘𝑡𝑡’ now refers to the time 
period and 𝑓𝑓 is a function (in the Supplementary Material section, we show the specific 
functional form that equation [EQ4] adopts when applied to the cases of the Theil index 
and the variance). Given the transformations undergone by these three components 
around the world during the last decades, it is interesting to gauge their relative 
importance in assessing changes in overall lifespan inequality over time. To address this 
issue we use a set of counterfactual analyses. We ask what would have happened to total 
lifespan inequality in time period ‘2’ if we held constant one of the three quantities that 
appear in the inequality index at its earlier (time period ‘1’) value and allowed the other 
two to take their later (time period ‘2’) value. In this way, we generate a counterfactual 
level of lifespan inequality in time period ‘2’ and by comparing this with observed 
inequality in time period ‘2’ we can assess the impact of change in the quantity we kept 
fixed at time ‘1’ levels on inequality. In this way, we generate the following 
counterfactual inequalities: 
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𝐶𝐶1 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔1}, {𝝁𝝁2}, {𝑰𝑰2})           [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸5] 
𝐶𝐶2 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔2}, {𝝁𝝁1}, {𝑰𝑰2})           [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸6] 
𝐶𝐶3 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔2}, {𝝁𝝁2}, {𝑰𝑰1})           [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸7] 
Hence, 𝐶𝐶1 indicates the level of lifespan inequality we would observe in time ‘2’ if the 
population shares of each country had remained at its time ‘1’ levels (i.e. in case there 
were no population growth). The second counterfactual measures the level of inequality 
we would observe in time ‘2’ in case the longevity in each country had not changed 
over time. Lastly, 𝐶𝐶3 measures the inequality we would observe in time ‘2’ if within-
country lifespan variation had remained at its time ‘1’ levels. Comparing the values of 
the counterfactuals 𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶3 with the observed inequality levels (i.e. 
𝐼𝐼1 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔1}, {𝝁𝝁1}, {𝑰𝑰1}) and 𝐼𝐼2 = 𝑓𝑓({𝒔𝒔2}, {𝝁𝝁2}, {𝑰𝑰2}) we can estimate which of the three 
factors might have been more decisive in driving lifespan inequality changes over time. 
Clearly, the counterfactuals shown in equations [EQ5] to [EQ7] can be computed both 
for conditional and unconditional lifespan distributions.  
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Regional trends 
In the different panels of Figure 1 we show the evolution of length of life distributions 
between 1950-55 and 2010-15 for the world as a whole and for its different regions. 
Two major changes have occurred when moving from the mid-20th century to the 
present date. First, all distributions have clearly shifted to the right, thus indicating a 
lengthening of lifespan across all regions and for the world as a whole. Second, the 
shape of the age-at-death distributions has changed dramatically during the last decades. 
Back in the 1950s, age-at-death distributions were twin-peaked, with a local/global 
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maximum for the first age bracket and another local/global maximum at an adult age 
varying across regions. With the unfolding of the epidemiological and demographic 
transitions, infant mortality has decreased dramatically, thus gradually shifting the age 
at death distributions towards the right and increasingly concentrating deaths around 
their modal age. While these trends generally apply to all regions, we observe lots of 
heterogeneity across them. After World War II, the child mortality peak of the age-at-
death distributions was higher than the adult mortality peak in all world regions except 
for the group of high-income countries – where child mortality levels were already very 
low in the 1950s. In the following decades, improvements in the age-at-death 
distributions can be observed across the board, but the pace of change has not been the 
same everywhere. In particular, we observe some stagnation around the 1990s for 
Central Asia and in the HIV-stricken countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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In the light of the aforementioned transformations, what is the extent of longevity and 
lifespan inequality of the age-at-death distributions shown in Figure 1? The results, 
presented in Table 1, show several patterns that are worth pointing out. As regards 
unconditional lifespan distributions, global and regional life expectancies at birth have 
tended to increase monotonically all over the world (see the first group of columns in 
Table 1). The group of high-income countries has always had the highest longevity 
(regional 𝑒𝑒0 of 65 in 1950-55 up to 78.6 in 2010-15). At the other extreme, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the region with lowest life expectancy all over the period (except in 1950-55, 
when South Asia was the region with the lowest regional 𝑒𝑒0). In tandem with these 
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increases in longevity, we also observe monotonic declines in unconditional lifespan 
inequality at all moments and in all places (no matter what inequality measure we 
choose) – a finding that aligns well with conceptually related studies [6]. Given the 
strong relationship between life expectancy at birth and unconditional lifespan 
inequality, it is not surprising to find the group of high-income countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa as the regions with lowest and highest length of life inequality all over 
the studied period.  
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Shifting our attention to adult mortality (see the second group of columns in Table 1), 
we find relatively similar trends. Average length of life above age 15 (𝜇𝜇15) tends to 
Table 1. Regional indicators of longevity and lifespan inequality for unconditional and 
conditional age-at-death distributions. EAP=East Asia & Pacific, CA= Central Asia, 
HIC=High-income countries, LAC=Latin America & Caribbean, MENA=Middle East 
& North Africa, SA=South Asia, SSH-HIV=Sub-Saharan Africa High HIV, SSA=Other 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN WPP data. 
 
Region Year Pop. 
(mio.) 
Full lifespan Ages 15+ Ages 65+ 
𝑒𝑒0 Theil Var 𝜇𝜇15 Theil Var 𝜇𝜇65 Theil Var 
EAP 
1950-55 732.7 44.6 0.298 854.0 59.4 0.049 308.4 74.6 0.0036 40.9 
1970-75 1137.1 60.6 0.141 672.4 68.6 0.027 228.5 77.1 0.0041 49.3 
1990-95 1659.3 68.8 0.077 473.4 73.0 0.021 199.7 78.9 0.0045 56.8 
2010-15 2005.0 74.2 0.038 299.3 75.8 0.018 186.2 80.6 0.0050 65.2 
CA 
1950-55 18.1 55.0 0.215 869.4 66.7 0.037 295.0 77.9 0.0051 62.6 
1970-75 34.4 62.4 0.149 753.7 70.9 0.030 268.5 79.5 0.0055 70.6 
1990-95 51.2 65.3 0.107 597.8 71.0 0.028 254.2 79.4 0.0053 67.8 
2010-15 63.9 70.0 0.057 388.4 72.6 0.023 217.3 79.4 0.0051 65.1 
HIC 
1950-55 854.0 65.0 0.105 576.3 70.6 0.027 235.3 78.4 0.0045 55.4 
1970-75 1046.1 71.1 0.049 350.9 73.2 0.022 212.8 79.6 0.0048 60.6 
1990-95 1184.9 74.3 0.036 305.1 75.5 0.022 226.4 81.5 0.0053 69.7 
2010-15 1275.7 78.6 0.026 256.7 79.2 0.019 214.8 84.1 0.0053 74.8 
LAC 
1950-55 168.7 52.0 0.243 900.1 64.8 0.043 323.4 77.3 0.0044 52.6 
1970-75 288.1 61.6 0.146 728.1 69.7 0.032 273.7 78.8 0.0048 60.6 
1990-95 448.5 68.8 0.078 500.3 72.5 0.029 265.5 80.3 0.0053 69.2 
2010-15 603.4 74.8 0.050 403.5 76.8 0.026 266.1 83.1 0.0061 84.4 
MENA 
1950-55 92.5 43.4 0.387 1058.1 63.5 0.046 327.5 76.5 0.0039 46.2 
1970-75 155.3 55.2 0.228 921.4 68.2 0.034 279.4 77.9 0.0043 52.7 
1990-95 261.2 66.7 0.097 559.7 72.1 0.025 226.6 79.0 0.0044 55.1 
2010-15 383.8 72.5 0.050 361.3 74.9 0.021 203.4 80.4 0.0046 59.5 
SA 
1950-55 477.0 37.2 0.411 880.3 55.4 0.065 367.7 75.0 0.0038 43.8 
1970-75 715.3 49.6 0.274 931.9 64.3 0.041 303.0 76.6 0.0044 52.0 
1990-95 1151.0 59.8 0.156 734.2 68.6 0.031 260.1 77.7 0.0047 57.2 
2010-15 1652.3 68.2 0.083 512.4 72.5 0.026 240.4 79.6 0.0054 68.4 
SSH-
HIV 
1950-55 122.8 37.3 0.428 927.5 56.9 0.064 372.8 74.9 0.0034 39.0 
1970-75 193.5 46.2 0.301 928.7 61.4 0.053 354.2 76.1 0.0039 45.6 
1990-95 334.5 49.7 0.250 878.3 62.2 0.052 360.1 76.8 0.0041 49.2 
2010-15 558.1 58.1 0.149 708.5 65.3 0.046 348.1 78.0 0.0044 54.5 
SSA 
1950-55 58.6 35.8 0.453 922.5 56.4 0.065 373.7 74.8 0.0034 38.6 
1970-75 92.0 43.3 0.346 961.9 60.4 0.057 368.3 76.1 0.0039 45.3 
1990-95 161.8 49.5 0.266 926.8 63.3 0.051 359.7 77.1 0.0041 49.5 
2010-15 290.5 59.2 0.152 730.4 67.1 0.041 325.6 78.2 0.0044 54.2 
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increase virtually in all places at all times, but not as fast as life expectancy at birth. 
Like in the previous case, the groups of high-income and Sub-Saharan African countries 
are the regions with highest and lowest levels of 𝜇𝜇15, respectively. Simultaneously, we 
observe generalized declines in adult lifespan variability – albeit at a much slower pace 
than the declines in overall lifespan inequality. There are some exceptions to this 
generally favorable trend in Central Asia and the high-income group around the 1990s 
(arguably as a consequence of the collapse of the Eastern bloc countries included in 
these regions), and in the HIV-stricken Sub-Saharan African countries. For the last 
group we observe some stagnation in the lifespan inequality declines around the 1990s 
and a slight inconsistency in the trends reported by the Theil index and the variance. 
The regional trends in overall and adult lifespan inequality reported in Table 1 cohere 
roughly with the findings reported by [19] in Figure 3. 
Lastly, the trends in elderly mortality are notably different (see the third group of 
columns in Table 1). As expected, average length of life above 65 (𝜇𝜇65) continues to 
increase in the world and most of its regions, but some regions increase faster than 
others. Interestingly, lifespan inequality among the elderly tends to increase over time 
for the world and all its regions (except in Central Asia): no matter what inequality 
indicator we use, we observe unequivocal increases in length of live variability in the 
older ages. Curiously, in contrast to the other lifespan inequality indicators shown in 
Table 1, the levels of lifespan inequality among the elderly across regions are relatively 
similar. In the 1950s, the group of high-income countries and Central Asia were the 
region with largest elder lifespan inequality, but in 2010 inequality was largest in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. These findings – which cohere with the results of [5] in the 
context of high-income countries – are extremely interesting for several reasons that 
will be discussed later.  
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4.2. Within countries lifespan inequality (WLI) 
In our previous analysis we have explored the regional trends in longevity and lifespan 
inequality. What can be said about the experience of individual countries? In Figure 2 
we show a 3×2 scatterplot matrix comparing longevity levels (horizontal axes) against 
the corresponding lifespan inequality indicators (vertical axes) using data from all world 
countries between 1950-55 and 2010-15. The scatterplots in the first, second and third 
rows are based on unconditional, above 15 and above 65 age-at-death distributions, 
respectively. The scatterplots on the first and second columns measure lifespan 
inequality using the Theil index and the variance, respectively. In all cases, we 
superimpose the regional trends for comparative purposes. In general, the trends shown 
in Figure 2 go in line with the ones presented in Table 1. Like in previous studies [4], 
[19], we observe a strong negative correlation between life expectancy at birth and 
unconditional lifespan inequality (see first row in Figure 2). As the epidemiologic 
transition unfolds, longevity increases in tandem with decreases in lifespan inequality. 
Interestingly, all regions seem to follow a very similar path of demographic 
convergence, although we observe more cross-country heterogeneity when using 
absolute measures than relative ones.  
Inspecting the relationship between longevity and adult mortality (i.e. disregarding 
under 15 mortality) a different picture arises (see second row in Figure 2). In this case, 
there is also a generally negative relationship between the two variables, but it is much 
weaker and the variability across countries and regions is substantially larger than 
before. Indeed, it is possible to identify several countries and regions where the 
inequality declines stall and are followed by extended plateaus (this is the case for High-
income countries or Latin America and the Caribbean). Once again, there is more 
between-country and between-region variability using absolute inequality measures than 
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using relative ones. Lastly, examining the relationship between countries’ longevity and 
lifespan inequality among the elderly, we observe diverging trends across the board (see 
third row in Figure 2): as world countries’ longevity increases, the variability in age-at-
death distributions among the elderly increases as well. The validity of this interesting 
result does not depend on the choice of inequality measure. 
  
4.3. Between country and global lifespan inequalities (BLI and GLI) 
What can we say about the trends in global lifespan inequality? To what extent are these 
trends determined by length of life differences within and between countries? What are 
the contributions of the intra- and inter-country disparities to GLI? Figure 3 plots the 
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trends in GLI and its within- and between-country components between 1950-55 and 
2010-15 (the values upon which this Figure is based are shown in the Supplementary 
Material section). In the first row, we show the results corresponding to the entire age-
at-death distributions, while the second and third rows show the results for the 
distributions bottom-truncated at 15 and 65, respectively. When considering 
unconditional age-at-death distributions, lifespan inequality has clearly declined over 
time – a result that does not depend on the choice of inequality measure. After six 
decades, GLI levels have shrunk dramatically from 0.26 to 0.06 for the Theil index and 
from 911.5 to 444.1 for the variance. Interestingly, most of the variation in lifespan 
across world citizens can be attributed to differences occurring within countries. The 
contribution of the between-country component for the Theil index goes from 11% in 
1950-55 to 7.6% in 2010-15 (for the variance, it declines from 16% to 10.7%).  
The values of GLI for the adult population are declining as well, but much less than in 
the previous case. The Theil index (resp. the variance) declines from 0.046 to 0.025 
(resp. from 333.2 to 244.7). In both cases, we observe a clear decline between 1950-55 
and 1980-85 followed by a long inequality plateau. In the case of the variance, we even 
observe some slight increases at the turn of the millennium. These results suggest that 
the expected global compression in adult mortality has stagnated during the last 30-35 
years approximately. Again, the contribution of the between-country component is 
relatively minor (around 6-12% for the Theil and 6-13% for the variance). Between-
country inequality in adult mortality decreased between 1950-55 and 1970-75, increased 
between 1970-75 and 2000-05 and declined again from 2000-05 until 2010-15. As 
regards the levels of GLI for age-at-death distributions above 65, we observe the 
opposite trend. During the last six decades, lifespan inequality among the world elderly 
has increased from 0.0044 to 0.0055 for the Theil index and from 52.6 to 72 for the 
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variance. Once again, these global differences can be mainly attributed to the disparities 
occurring within countries. The within-country component of global lifespan inequality 
among the elder has been increasing during the whole period, while the between-
country component has declined between 1950-55 and 1970-75 and started increasing 
unabated from 1970-75 until 2010-15. 
  
4.4. Counterfactual analysis 
During the last six decades, the world has undergone major socio-demographic 
transformations. Both the population size and the rate of increase of longevity have 
varied considerably across countries. In addition, the shape of lifespan distributions 
changed substantially over time. In this swiftly changing context, it is important to 
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evaluate what of these explanatory factors have been more decisive in driving changes 
to GLI levels. For that purpose, we have run several counterfactual analyses. Using 
equations [4]-[7], we compare the real trends of GLI with the ones that would have been 
observed had some of its subcomponents (countries’ population shares, longevity and 
lifespan variability) remained constant over time. Table 2 reports such counterfactual 
trends, both for the Theil index and the variance and for conditional and unconditional 
age-at-death distributions. 
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Table 2. Counterfactual analyses for the Theil index (Panel A) and the variance (Panel 
B). Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN WPP data. 
Considering the entire age range, we can conclude that within-country inequality is the 
strongest determinant of the observed declines in GLI (see counterfactual 𝐶𝐶3). Had 
within-country inequality remained at its 1950-55 levels, GLI levels would have been 
much higher than the observed ones (i.e. from the “true” 0.0629 for the Theil in 2010-
15 up to 0.3036, and from the “true” 444.1 for the variance in 2010-15 up to 868.9). At 
the other extreme, had population shares remained at their 1950-55 levels, global 
Panel A: Theil counterfactuals  
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 0.2629 0.2183 0.1571 0.1216 0.1028 0.0827 0.0629 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  0.2153 0.1504 0.1126 0.0922 0.0713 0.0520 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  0.2126 0.1443 0.1071 0.0878 0.0684 0.0497 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 )  0.2664 0.2693 0.2782 0.2881 0.2970 0.3036 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 (15+) 0.0466 0.0407 0.0316 0.029 0.0277 0.0275 0.0249 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  0.0403 0.0307 0.0277 0.0263 0.0254 0.0225 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  0.0400 0.0305 0.0277 0.0264 0.0258 0.0227 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 )  0.0464 0.0454 0.0467 0.0479 0.0497 0.0500 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 (65+) 0.0044 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 0.005 0.0052 0.0055 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  0.0046 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0053 0.0056 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  0.0046 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0052 0.0055 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 )  0.0044 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 
Panel B: Variance counterfactuals 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 911.5 860.8 744.9 650.3 593.0 525.5 444.1 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  856.3 727.8 621.3 555.0 478.1 392.9 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  862.9 794.4 709.5 655.2 588.6 526.1 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 )  912.7 870.1 867.5 872.4 879.6 868.9 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (15+) 333.2 309.6 264.4 254.6 251.5 257.9 244.7 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  307.7 260.5 248.1 245.1 246.4 231.2 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  314.6 289.5 278.6 273.7 272.2 265.2 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 )  330.1 312.6 317.4 322.9 335.2 333.3 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (65+) 52.6 55.2 56.5 59.1 63.0 67.0 72.0 
𝐶𝐶1 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐)  55.5 57.9 61.7 66.1 69.9 74.9 
𝐶𝐶2 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇)  54.8 58.8 61.0 64.2 67.3 71.2 
𝐶𝐶3 (𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 )  52.8 48.6 48.4 48.6 49.2 50.1 
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lifespan inequality would be slightly smaller as it is today (see counterfactual 𝐶𝐶1). 
Hence, even if population growth per se has contributed to widen the global lifespan 
distribution, its effect has been quantitatively small. Somewhere in between, we observe 
that the effect of longevity on GLI depends on the choice of inequality measure. For the 
Theil index, changes in longevity have slightly deterred further declines in GLI (i.e. 
fixing longevity at its 1950-55 levels, GLI would have reached 0.049 rather than the 
observed 0.06), while the opposite effect is found for the variance (see 
counterfactual 𝐶𝐶2). The counterfactual analyses applied to the age-at-death distributions 
bottom-truncated at the age of 15 are qualitatively very similar to the previous ones (see 
central rows in the two panels of Table 2). Lastly, the results for the distributions 
truncated at 65 suggest that neither population growth nor longevity changes have had 
an important effect in driving GLI trends. Once again, lifespan inequality trends within 
countries seems to be the major factor behind the observed GLI trends. Had within 
country inequality levels remained fixed at their 1950-55 levels, GLI levels among the 
elderly would have barely changed during the last sixty years. 
Summing up, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that the changes in global 
lifespan inequality have been mainly driven by changes in within-country lifespan 
variability and, to a much lesser extent, by longevity trends across countries. Population 
growth has played a minor role in this process. 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we document for the first time global trends in lifespan inequality from 
the 1950s to the present day. Our findings indicate that the extent of worldwide lifespan 
variability depends largely on the range of ages we are taking into account. When 
considering the entire age-at-death distributions, we observe a sustained decline in 
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lifespan variability in the world and its regions between 1950-55 and 2010-15. Such 
concentration in the age-at-death distributions goes hand in hand with generalized 
increases in life expectancy at birth – a finding that squares well with related findings 
reported in previous studies [4], [6], [19]. When the focus shifts to adult mortality (i.e. 
considering ages above 15), we also observe declines in global lifespan variability, but 
the evidence is not as compelling as before. While there are clear signs of sustained 
decline between 1950-55 and 1970-75, from the last year onwards we observe the 
emergence of inequality plateaus and even trend reversals not only in some specific 
regions like the Eastern European countries, the HIV-stricken countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean, but also in the world as a whole. These 
results are in line with the findings of [3] reporting adult lifespan inequality plateaus for 
a selected group of highly industrialized countries. Most of these changes have taken 
place in spite of the generalized increases in longevity among the adult population. 
Lastly, focusing our attention on mortality trends among the elderly (i.e. ages above 65), 
we observe increases in lifespan inequality across all countries, regions, and in the 
world as a whole (with Latin American and high-income countries exhibiting the 
highest levels of inequality). Again, such changes have occurred against a backdrop of 
generalized mortality reductions. While such increase in elderly lifespan inequality 
should be expected in a context of increasing longevity, it is nonetheless important to 
document what countries or regions are spearheading the process and which ones are 
lagging behind. 
Decomposing global lifespan inequality levels in its within- and between-country 
components, we observe that most of the world variability in ages at death can be 
explained by differences occurring within countries. Depending on the inequality 
measure and the period we choose, the within-country component explains around 85% 
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and 95% of the total variation ([4] and [19] report analogous contributions within that 
range). This suggests that traditional narratives in global health disparities focusing on 
international variations in life expectancy (e.g. [18], [30]) neglect the major source of 
lifespan inequality: the one that takes place within countries. This is precisely the 
component that has experienced the most dramatic changes during the last six decades. 
Indeed, our counterfactual analyses suggest that the observed changes in global lifespan 
inequality can be largely attributable to the changes in within-country lifespan 
distributions, while the contribution of increasing longevity and differential population 
growth have played a relatively minor role. While the between-country component is 
relatively small, it does not mean it is irrelevant. Even if between-country inequality in 
life expectancies at birth declined unabated from 1950-55 onwards, the cross-national 
inequality in the mean age at death among adults (i.e. deaths occurring beyond the age 
of 15) declined between 1950-55 and 1970-75, increased between 1970-75 and 2000-
05, but resumed its downward trend until 2010-15. The description given in [19] for the 
period between 1970 and 2000 (identifying the rising between-country inequality in 
adult length-of-life) fits well with our findings, which provide a longer and more 
nuanced time perspective of the recent trends in international health inequality (during 
the last decade, between-country inequality in adult lifespan has resumed a declining 
trajectory). Lastly, between-country inequality in the mean age at death among the 
elderly declined between 1950-55 and 1970-75 but started increasing from the last 
period until the present day – a 40-year divergence pattern across countries. 
The increase in lifespan variability among the elderly was previously investigated in a 
selected group of highly industrialized countries [5]. According to the authors of that 
study, the systematic increases in longevity alter the health profile of survivors in 
fundamental ways: advances in medicine, socio-economic conditions and public health 
Pre-print. Forthcoming: PLoS ONE 
27 
 
planning have facilitated that frailer individuals reach more advanced ages, thus 
increasing the heterogeneity in health profiles among the elderly. As shown in this 
paper, it turns out that such mechanisms might have been operating not only in high-
income settings, but also across all world countries and regions (irrespective of their 
stage in the demographic or epidemiological transitions).  
5.1. Sex-specific results 
As done in conceptually related studies (e.g. [19]), the empirical results presented in this 
paper document lifespan inequality trends for the population as a whole (i.e. using both-
sexes life tables). Yet, it is well known that (a) women tend to survive to older ages than 
men, and (b) age-at-death distributions tend to exhibit greater variability among men 
([4], [14]). However, calculating our indicators for women and men separately, we 
observe that sex-specific trends in lifespan inequality follow the same general patterns 
we have identified in this study for the general population. For the sake of simplicity, 
we have preferred to avoid the duplicity of tables and graphs leading to the same 
qualitative conclusions (for the interested reader, the sex-specific results are available 
upon request). 
5.2. Sources of lifespan inequality 
What factors might be driving these remarkable trends in lifespan inequality? As 
regards the determinants of international health inequalities (i.e. differences in longevity 
between countries), researchers have advanced several explanations. In an attempt to 
overcome the limitations of Omran’s epidemiological transition theory ([33]), [34 – 35] 
put forward the framework of ‘divergence-convergence cycles’. According to these 
authors, health transitions can be seen as a succession of  cycles composed of 
divergence periods (generated by revolutionary health innovations, like eradication of 
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infectious diseases, or the cardiovascular revolution), followed by the convergence that 
ensues when laggard countries adapt and catch up with the forerunners. Indeed, the non-
monotonic trends observed in adult and elderly lifespan inequality between countries 
(see middle and bottom panels in Figure 3) fit well with that description. Very often, the 
diffusion of knowledge and the adoption of new technologies are listed among the key 
drivers of international health convergence. Yet, the evolution of such cycles can be 
suddenly interrupted when socio-economic, political or other external shocks disrupt 
them for any reason. In this regard, the collapse of the Eastern Block and the spread of 
HIV/AIDS among Sub-Saharan African countries have been held responsible for the 
global increase in international health disparities around the 1990s [30]. Lastly, socio-
economic differentials can be another key factor that might explain longevity variations 
across countries. In this line, the increasing cross-country disparities in elderly longevity 
might be partially explained by countries’ unequal access to increasingly expensive 
technologies that further prolong the lifespan of elderly populations. 
As shown before, most of global lifespan inequality changes have taken place within 
countries. The fundamental factor that has contributed to reduce countries’ lifespan 
variability is the reduction in infant mortality. This decrease has been extensively 
documented elsewhere [36 – 37] and can be largely attributed to the use of cheap and 
widely available treatments, like the use of oral rehydration and antibiotics. Among 
adults and the elderly, within-country disparities in lifespan are often associated with 
the existence of socio-economic gradients. The positive association between socio-
economic status (SES) and adult health and survival is well-established [38 – 39]. To 
illustrate, higher-educated individuals are, through their higher income, more able to 
afford food, clothing and accommodation, have jobs that entail fewer health risks, are 
more engaged in healthy life styles and better informed to use health services and new 
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medical treatments [40 – 41]. In this regard, a collection of case studies in high-income 
settings suggests a clear patterning of longevity and lifespan variability within 
countries’ SES groups along the following lines. On the one hand, researchers have 
often found diverging longevity trends across SES groups, with the socially advantaged 
ones benefiting more than the rest ([42 – 47]; see left panel in Figure 4). On the other 
hand, a handful of studies suggest that (i) there is a negative gradient between SES and 
lifespan inequality (i.e. lower socio-economic groups tend to have higher levels of 
lifespan inequality), and (ii) the gradient becomes steeper over time because of the 
decrease (resp. increase) in lifespan variability among high (resp. low) SES groups (e.g. 
[10 – 11], [48 – 49]; see right panel in Figure 4). Overall, these findings suggest the 
emergence of divergent health dynamics across SES groups within national borders (at 
least in the context of high-income countries). Whether or not these diverging patterns 
are taking place as well in middle- and low-income countries is a matter for future 
research. 
5.3. Limitations and conclusions 
Pre-print. Forthcoming: PLoS ONE 
30 
 
The analysis presented in this paper have some limitations. First, all our findings are 
based on the worldwide life tables provided by the UN Population Division, some of 
which are based on estimated data. The indirect methods that are usually employed to 
estimate life tables based on incomplete information might over-smooth the 
corresponding age-at-death distributions – a potential source of downward bias for our 
lifespan inequality estimates. While we acknowledge that such bias might affect our 
estimates of lifespan inequality levels to a certain extent, we content that it is less likely 
that it affects lifespan inequality trends, which are the main subject of interest in this 
paper. In addition, comparing lifespan inequality levels for those countries 
simultaneously included in the UN database and in the Human Mortality Database 
shows an extremely high level of correlation (see Supplementary Material section). 
Second, the UN life tables are constructed up to age 100, while the HMD life tables 
include ages up to 110, an issue that might downwardly bias our lifespan inequality 
estimates. Once again, robustness checks presented in the Supplementary Material 
section show that this source of bias is negligibly small. Lastly, our counterfactual 
lifespan inequality analyses might look somewhat crude at first sight. Using ceteris-
paribus-like arguments, they simply assume that some of the three components in our 
inequality measures can be kept fixed while allowing the others to change over time as 
they actually did, as if they were completely independent entities. Despite this 
limitation, such techniques are very useful to derive first-order approximations of 
complex phenomena that otherwise would be very difficult to model – a factor that 
explains their popularity in demographic studies (e.g. [30], [50 – 51]).  
Despite those limitations, the results presented in this paper confirm that the study of 
health inequalities should not be limited to the analysis of differences in life expectancy 
across countries. Since most lifespan variability takes place within countries, focusing 
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on the trends of central longevity indicators alone one disregards the major source of 
variability, thus potentially arriving at overly simplistic conclusions. During the last 
decades, much progress has been made in increasing longevity while reducing age-at-
death variability across the full lifespan and, to a lesser extent, across adult ages. Yet, 
we now appear to face a new challenge: the emergence of diverging trends in lifespan 
inequality among the elderly around the globe. While lifespan inequality is increasing 
among the elderly virtually across all world countries, longevity and heterogeneity in 
mortality among the old has increased faster in the richer regions of the globe. As larger 
fractions of the world population survive to more advanced ages, it will be necessary 
that national and international health planners recognize the growing heterogeneity that 
characterizes older populations. 
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Supplementary Material 
Countries’ regional classification (United Nations) 
East Asia & Pacific:  
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Indonesia, 
Kiribati, Korea (North), Korea (South), Lao PDR, Macao, SAR China, Malaysia, 
Micronesia, Federated States of, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Caledonia, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
Tonga, Vanuatu, Viet Nam. 
 
Central Asia: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
 
High Income: 
Albania, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Republic of, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Pre-print. Forthcoming: PLoS ONE 
38 
 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of 
America. 
 
Latin America & Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French 
Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Martinique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic), Virgin Islands. 
 
Middle East & North Africa 
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab 
Republic (Syria), Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
 
South Asia: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo, (Kinshasa), 
Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mayotte, Niger, Reunion, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa High HIV: 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Decomposition of Global Lifespan Inequality 
The following table shows the levels and trends of global lifespan inequality and its 
decomposition in between-country and within-country inequality (Figure 3 is based 
upon these numbers). 
Theil decomposition of GLI 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 0.2629 0.2183 0.1571 0.1216 0.1028 0.0827 0.0629 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤  0.2341 0.1947 0.1449 0.1126 0.0950 0.0756 0.0581 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏  0.0288 0.0236 0.0122 0.0090 0.0078 0.0072 0.0048 
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%𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 10.9 10.8 7.7 7.4 7.6 8.6 7.6 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 (15+) 0.0466 0.0407 0.0316 0.0290 0.0277 0.0275 0.0249 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤  0.0410 0.0362 0.0298 0.0273 0.0259 0.0249 0.0229 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏  0.0056 0.0045 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0026 0.0020 %𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 12.0 11.0 5.7 6.1 6.7 9.5 8.0 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 (65+) 0.0044 0.0046 0.0046 0.0047 0.0050 0.0052 0.0055 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤  0.0041 0.0042 0.0044 0.0045 0.0047 0.0048 0.0051 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏  0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 %𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 7.6 7.8 3.8 4.7 5.5 6.6 7.6 
Variance decomposition of GLI 
Year 1950-
55 
1960-
65 
1970-
75 
1980-
85 
1990-
95 
2000-
05 
2010-
15 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 911.5 860.8 744.9 650.3 593 525.5 444.1 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤  766.6 722.4 659.6 578.9 528 461 396.6 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏  144.9 138.4 85.3 71.4 65.0 64.5 47.5 %𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 15.9 16.1 11.5 11.0 11.0 12.3 10.7 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (15+) 333.2 309.6 264.4 254.6 251.5 257.9 244.7 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 288.4 271.1 247.4 237.2 232.7 230.7 222.9 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 44.8 38.5 17.0 17.4 18.8 27.2 21.8 %𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 13.4 12.4 6.4 6.8 7.5 10.5 8.9 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (65+) 52.6 55.2 56.5 59.1 63.0 67.0 72.0 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 48.7 51.0 54.3 56.3 59.5 62.6 66.5 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 4.0 4.3 2.2 2.8 3.5 4.4 5.5 %𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉 (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤. ) 7.5 7.7 3.9 4.8 5.5 6.6 7.6 
Table S1. Theil and variance decompositions of Global Lifespan Inequality over time 
for the full age-at-death distribution, the deaths above 15 and above 65. Source: 
Authors’ elaboration based on UN WPP data. 
Computing the counterfactuals. 
In order to compute the counterfactuals shown in equations [EQ5], [EQ6] and [EQ7], 
we need to write the Theil index and the variance in an appropriate form that explicitly 
shows the dependency of these measures on the following three factors: (i) population 
shares (𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐), (ii) longevity (𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐), and (iii) lifespan variability (𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐). We start with the Theil 
index. Assuming we have a list of 𝑐𝑐 countries (indexed by 𝑐𝑐), it is well-known that the 
Theil index at time 𝑡𝑡 can be written as  
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 �𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 �𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
+ �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
         [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸1] 
The first part in equation [EQA1] is the between-country component (which is obtained 
assuming all individuals in each country die at the same age, so there is no within- 
country variation) and the second one is the within- country component (which is a 
weighted sum of the within-country inequalities). Observing that global average age at 
death is equal to the population-weighted sum of country-specific average age at 
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deaths, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1  the additive decomposition of the Theil index (shown in 
[EQA1]) for time ‘𝑡𝑡’ can be rewritten as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1 𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐 � 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1 �𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1 + �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸2] 
In equation [EQA2] we explicitly see how the Theil index in time ‘𝑡𝑡’ can be written as a 
function of countries’ population shares (𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡), longevity (𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡), and lifespan 
variability (𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡). 
As regards the variance, it is also well-known that it can be written as 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡�𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡�2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
+ �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸3] 
This is the additive decomposition of the variance. The first part in equation [EQA3] is 
the between-country component and the second one is the within- country component 
(which is a weighted sum of the within-country inequalities). After simple algebraic 
manipulations, the last equation can be written as 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
− 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
2 + �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸4] 
Once again, since 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=1 , we can finally rewrite the variance in time 𝑡𝑡 as 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡2𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
− ��𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡�2 + �𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐=1
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸5] 
This way, we have written the global variance as a function of the three ingredients we 
were looking for: the vector of country-specific population shares (𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡), variances (𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡) 
and longevity levels (𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡). 
 
Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our empirical findings, we have performed different 
consistency tests. First, we have recalculated all our findings using well-known 
inequality measures other than the Theil index and the variance. Second, we have 
investigated whether or not the fact of working with life tables up to age 100 (rather 
than the value of 110 available in the HMD life tables) can downwardly bias our results.  
1. Use of alternative inequality measures 
Are our findings robust to the choice of alternative inequality measures? To check the 
robustness of our empirical findings, we will use other well-known inequality measures. 
Pre-print. Forthcoming: PLoS ONE 
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One of them will be the family of Generalized Entropy measures GE(θ), which includes 
the Theil index as a particular case when 𝜃𝜃 = 1. It is defined as 
GE(𝜃𝜃) =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧1
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎
1
𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 − 1) �𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 ��𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎�𝜃𝜃 − 1�𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
   𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓  𝜃𝜃 ≠ 0,11
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎
�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥
�
𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓  𝜃𝜃 = 01
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎
�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 �
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥
𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎
� 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥
𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎
�
𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓  𝜃𝜃 = 1
               [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸6]               
The choice of different values of 𝜃𝜃 give more emphasis to different parts of the 
distribution3. In Table S2, we show the regional trends in GE(θ) when θ=0 and θ=2. In 
addition, Table S2 shows the regional trends in lifespan inequality when using the Gini 
index and the coefficient of variation, which are defined as follows: 
𝐺𝐺 = 12𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎2𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎 ��𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
�𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 − 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�
𝜔𝜔
𝑥𝑥=𝑎𝑎
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸7] 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉 = �𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎
𝜇𝜇𝑎𝑎
          [𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸8] 
                                                          
3 Lower values of 𝜃𝜃 are associated with greater sensitivity to inequality at the lower tail of the distribution 
(i.e. among children and young individuals), and higher values of 𝜃𝜃 place more weight to inequality 
among the elderly. When 𝜃𝜃 = 0 we obtain the so-called ‘mean log deviation’ (MLD) and when 𝜃𝜃 = 2, GE(2) is ordinally equivalent to the squared coefficient of variation. 
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  Full lifespan Ages 15+ Ages 65+ 
Region Year GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV GE(0) GE(2) Gini CV 
EAP 
1950-55 0.7969 0.2154 0.3691 0.6564 0.0579 0.0437 0.1652 0.2955 0.0035 0.0036 0.0462 0.0850 
1970-75 0.4546 0.0926 0.2221 0.4303 0.0324 0.0241 0.1183 0.2195 0.0041 0.0041 0.0507 0.0908 
1990-95 0.2710 0.0507 0.1555 0.3185 0.0252 0.0187 0.1025 0.1934 0.0045 0.0045 0.0535 0.0952 
2010-15 0.1199 0.0275 0.1152 0.2344 0.0213 0.0162 0.0955 0.1802 0.0050 0.0050 0.0562 0.0999 
ECA 
1950-55 0.4900 0.0987 0.2310 0.4442 0.0357 0.0262 0.1233 0.2289 0.0044 0.0044 0.0527 0.0940 
1970-75 0.2197 0.0461 0.1526 0.3036 0.0294 0.0221 0.1132 0.2104 0.0046 0.0047 0.0542 0.0965 
1990-95 0.1726 0.0414 0.1483 0.2879 0.0317 0.0242 0.1199 0.2200 0.0049 0.0049 0.0560 0.0992 
2010-15 0.0972 0.0297 0.1269 0.2436 0.0285 0.0220 0.1137 0.2095 0.0053 0.0052 0.0578 0.1021 
HIC 
1950-55 0.3558 0.0718 0.1937 0.3790 0.0336 0.0248 0.1202 0.2228 0.0045 0.0046 0.0537 0.0955 
1970-75 0.1981 0.0426 0.1458 0.2918 0.0276 0.0207 0.1093 0.2036 0.0049 0.0049 0.0558 0.0990 
1990-95 0.1071 0.0282 0.1191 0.2373 0.0244 0.0184 0.1021 0.1916 0.0053 0.0053 0.0580 0.1025 
2010-15 0.0635 0.0200 0.1005 0.1999 0.0201 0.0152 0.0921 0.1746 0.0054 0.0052 0.0578 0.1025 
LAC 
1950-55 0.7201 0.1691 0.3210 0.5815 0.0520 0.0385 0.1534 0.2773 0.0043 0.0043 0.0519 0.0931 
1970-75 0.4844 0.0994 0.2333 0.4458 0.0372 0.0275 0.1272 0.2346 0.0046 0.0046 0.0540 0.0962 
1990-95 0.2633 0.0559 0.1711 0.3343 0.0353 0.0261 0.1233 0.2283 0.0051 0.0052 0.0572 0.1017 
2010-15 0.1492 0.0375 0.1398 0.2739 0.0323 0.0236 0.1165 0.2173 0.0061 0.0061 0.0625 0.1104 
MENA 
1950-55 1.1240 0.3043 0.4370 0.7802 0.0564 0.0415 0.1597 0.2880 0.0039 0.0039 0.0494 0.0888 
1970-75 0.7129 0.1570 0.3039 0.5604 0.0438 0.0318 0.1371 0.2521 0.0041 0.0042 0.0510 0.0911 
1990-95 0.3063 0.0600 0.1730 0.3464 0.0305 0.0222 0.1121 0.2109 0.0043 0.0044 0.0524 0.0933 
2010-15 0.1647 0.0341 0.1270 0.2613 0.0240 0.0177 0.0987 0.1879 0.0045 0.0045 0.0532 0.0944 
SA 
1950-55 1.0375 0.3185 0.4536 0.7982 0.0768 0.0607 0.1990 0.3485 0.0038 0.0039 0.0484 0.0884 
1970-75 0.7927 0.1913 0.3427 0.6185 0.0498 0.0369 0.1499 0.2715 0.0043 0.0045 0.0524 0.0943 
1990-95 0.4986 0.1051 0.2411 0.4585 0.0380 0.0278 0.1278 0.2359 0.0047 0.0048 0.0545 0.0975 
2010-15 0.2819 0.0567 0.1703 0.3367 0.0312 0.0233 0.1165 0.2160 0.0054 0.0055 0.0588 0.1047 
SSH-HIV 
1950-55 1.0868 0.3611 0.4796 0.8498 0.0765 0.0588 0.1948 0.3430 0.0033 0.0034 0.0455 0.0828 
1970-75 0.8855 0.2586 0.4067 0.7192 0.0680 0.0506 0.1784 0.3180 0.0038 0.0039 0.0489 0.0882 
1990-95 0.7151 0.1900 0.3448 0.6165 0.0614 0.0450 0.1668 0.3001 0.0041 0.0041 0.0508 0.0909 
2010-15 0.4383 0.1045 0.2455 0.4571 0.0502 0.0362 0.1471 0.2692 0.0044 0.0044 0.0527 0.0938 
SSH 
1950-55 1.0505 0.3336 0.4621 0.8168 0.0754 0.0575 0.1922 0.3392 0.0034 0.0035 0.0458 0.0834 
1970-75 0.7973 0.2172 0.3707 0.6591 0.0639 0.0470 0.1710 0.3067 0.0039 0.0039 0.0492 0.0887 
1990-95 0.6779 0.1781 0.3343 0.5968 0.0622 0.0466 0.1708 0.3052 0.0041 0.0042 0.0509 0.0913 
2010-15 0.4174 0.1050 0.2497 0.4583 0.0552 0.0408 0.1584 0.2857 0.0044 0.0045 0.0531 0.0946 
Table S2. Lifespan inequality using different indicators across world regions between 1950-55 and 2010-15. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UN WPP data.
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The results shown in Table S2 indicate that our findings are highly robust when using 
other inequality indices. Even if the inequality levels inevitably change when using 
alternative measures, the differences across regions and over time are preserved. No 
matter what inequality index we use, we observe generalized declines in age-at-death 
inequality for the complete lifespan, weaker declines (and even some trend reversals) 
when focusing on adult mortality, and generalized increases among the elderly. 
  
2. Upper limit of the life table 
To assess the robustness of our findings to the use of abridged life tables at age 100, we 
revisit our analysis with data from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) which 
contains life table up to age 110 for a limited numbers of (mostly high-income) 
countries. We find that, considering the full population of ages 0 to 110, the impact of 
lumping ages 100-110 together in a single category is very small: it amounts to less than 
0.01 percent on average for all measures, with the smallest changes occurring for the 
Gini coefficients (which, as opposed to the other measures employed in the analysis, is 
not sensitive to the top-, but rather to the middle of the distribution). The largest 
percentage change observed across all measures, countries, and years is still only 0.5 
percent and occurs for variance of the country with the highest life expectancy in the 
entire dataset, Japan, in the 2010-2015 time period. Naturally, if the population is 
restricted to older subpopulations, the impact of abridgment is larger, but still negligibly 
small: for the 65+ population, the changes on our inequality measures are all lower than 
.01 percent on average. Given that the countries in the HMD are among those with the 
highest life expectancies worldwide, the effects of abridging life tables at age 100 can 
be expected to be even smaller for less developed countries where only a very small part 
of the population survives above age 100 even in the more recent years. We therefore 
conclude that the use of abridged life tables has virtually no impact, neither qualitatively 
nor quantitatively, on the results obtained in this paper.   
 
 
